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Agencies of the European Union have been developed in response to 
the deepening of the internal market, which caused a significant 
expansion of tasks in various policy areas and engendered strain on 
the functioning of the Commission as the engine of the integration 
process. The delegation of powers to European agencies freed the 
Commission from a number of regulatory and/or executive tasks that 
are predominantly of a technical or scientific nature, which in turn 
require specific expertise. Currently there are 35 European agencies, 
the majority of which have been set up in the last decade.  
 
The system of European agencies is ambiguous and lacks a common 
framework. Instead, the system has been developed on a case by case 
basis. The result is a very heterogeneous situation concerning, inter 
alia European agencies’ functions, decision-making powers and 
structures. Delegating powers to agencies also raises questions about 
their accountability and the legitimacy of their actions. The 
Commission, being aware of these problems, made reform proposals, 
but to no avail.  
 
The objective of this paper is to outline the situation of European 
agencies and its inherent problems. The first part provides an 
overview of the different stages in the development of European 
agencies, while the second part looks more closely at the agencies’ 
characteristics and how they can be defined. The following section 
addresses the main issues related to European agencies and the final 
part offers proposals for reform that are now being scrutinised. 
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GOVERNANCE OF THE EU: 
THE REFORM DEBATE ON EUROPEAN 
AGENCIES REIGNITED 
SAMI ANDOURA AND PETER TIMMERMAN
* 
Introduction 
The emergence of autonomous, decentralised bodies, grouped under the umbrella of European 
agencies, constitutes one of the most remarkable institutional developments of the European 
Union (EU). European agencies have been developed in response to the deepening of the 
internal market, which caused a significant expansion of tasks in various policy areas and 
engendered strain on the functioning of the Commission as the engine of the integration process. 
The delegation of powers to European agencies freed the Commission from a number of 
regulatory and/or executive tasks that are predominantly of a technical or scientific nature, 
which in turn require specific expertise.  
The delegation of powers to European agencies is a relatively recent phenomenon. Currently 
there are 35 European agencies operating, the majority of which have been set up in the last 
decade. The increased number and importance of European agencies has not grown at a steady 
or constant pace, however. 
The system of European agencies is ambiguous and confusing, due to the lack of a common 
framework. Instead, the development of European agencies has been based on a case by case 
situation. The result is a very heterogeneous situation concerning, inter alia European agencies’ 
functions, decision-making powers and structures. The delegation of powers to European 
agencies also raises questions about the accountability of European agencies and the legitimacy 
of their actions. The Commission, being aware of these problems, made reform proposals, but to 
no avail.  
The aim of this paper is to outline the situation of European agencies and its inherent problems. 
The first part will provide an overview of the different stages in the development of European 
agencies, while the second part looks more closely at the agencies’ characteristics and how they 
can be defined. The following part addresses the main issues related to European agencies and 
the final section offers proposals for reform that are now being scrutinised. 
1.  The explosive evolution of European agencies 
1.1  Three generations of agencies
1 
Since the EU began to function, the delegation and decentralisation of powers have been applied 
by the institutions by means of seeking assistance from various committees and agencies to 
carry out specific tasks.
2 
                                                      
* Sami Andoura is Senior Research Fellow at EGMONT – The Royal Institute for International Relations 
& Deputy Editor-in-Chief of Studia Diplomatica. Peter Timmerman is Research Fellow at EGMONT – 
The Royal Institute for International Relations. 
1 See Annex for a comprehensive overview of the agencies, which contains information regarding their 
date of creation, location of the head office, reference to the constituent legislative act and their principal 
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The increase in the number of European agencies has not seen a steady and constant growth. 
Because a single legal framework was lacking, agencies were created on a case by case basis 
and followed the evolution of the growth of European policy competencies. Three successive 
waves of agency creation can be distinguished:  
The first wave dates back to the mid-70s, when two agencies were created in the domain of 
social policy: the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (CEDEFOP) 
and the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 
(EUROFOUND). Although agencies represented a new type of governance at European level, 
such autonomous bodies had previously been created at national level in numerous countries in- 
and outside of Europe.  
The second wave dates back to the 90s, when the completion of the internal market made 
administrative regulation (such as technical product requirements) necessary in new policy 
areas, with the idea that regulation at EU level could help overcome obstacles to the single 
market. Moreover, as the complexity and extent of the European competences increased in the 
late eighties, it became apparent that the exclusively legislative approach to integration was 
somewhat imperfect. For the EC/EU to achieve full market integration through harmonising 
national legislations required the transposition of European legislation into national legislation. 
Either it led to bottlenecks at national level, resulting from the transposition and implementation 
process, or in overregulation at Community level, specifically aimed at excluding this 
differential national implementation.  
Given the growing need for administrative regulation at the European level and because some of 
those new policy areas were highly technical in nature, specific knowledge and expertise were 
required. This led to the creation of new specialised agencies in the early nineties.
3 This internal 
market argument is particularly the case for the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market 
(OHIM), the Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO) and the European Medicines Agency 
(EMEA), which are active in the context of the free movement of goods in the entire 
Community. However, several of these agencies also have a social dimension attached to them. 
The most outspoken is the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (EU-OSHA), but 
also EMEA, the European Environment Agency (EEA) or the European Monitoring Centre for 
Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) address health or safety aspects. Rather than 
categorising these agencies as outspoken social or market economy driven, they can be 
classified as market corrective.
4  
This second generation accounted for 11 more agencies: the European Training Foundation 
(ETF), EEA, the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), 
EMEA, OHIM, EU-OSHA, CPVO, the Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European 
Union (CdT), the European Police Office (EUROPOL), the European Monitoring Centre on 
Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC)
5 and the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR). 
A third generation of agencies has been set up since 2001. This third wave of European 
agencies can partly be explained by the desire of the Commission to refocus on its principal 
tasks at the time. In the aftermath of the resignation of the Santer Commission in 1999, due to 
                                                                                                                                                            
2 E. Vos, “Reforming the European Commission: What Role to Play for EU Agencies?”, Common Market 
Law Review, 37, 2000, pp. 1116-1117. 
3 G. Majone, “The new European Agencies: regulation by information”, Journal of European Public 
Policy, 4, 2, June 1997, pp. 263, 268. 
4 E. Chiti, “The emergence of a Community administration: The case of European agencies”, Common 
Market Law Review, 37, 2000, pp 312-314. 
5 EUMC was in 2007 transformed into the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA). GOVERNANCE OF THE EU: THE REFORM DEBATE ON EUROPEAN AGENCIES REIGNITED | 3 
 
fraud, mismanagement and nepotism, the new Prodi Commission launched an institutional audit 
to restore faith in the Commission.
6 One of the main findings regarded the need for the 
Commission to concentrate on core functions such as policy conception. Delegation to other 
bodies – namely the agencies – would thus enable the Commission to concentrate more on its 
core tasks and activities by removing some of its administrative burden.
7  
This third generation accounts for no less than 22 new agencies created: the European Union 
Institute for Security Studies (ISS), the European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC), the European 
Food Safety Authority (EFSA), the European Union’s Judicial Cooperation Unit (EUROJUST), 
the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), 
the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA), the European Centre for 
Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), the European Railway Agency (ERA), the European 
GNSS Supervisory Authority (GSA), the European Defence Agency (EDA), the European 
Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (FRONTEX), 
the Executive Agency for the Public Health Programme (PHEA), the Education, Audiovisual 
and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA), the Community Fisheries Control Agency (CFCA), 
the Trans-European Transport Network Executive Agency (TEN-TEA), the European Police 
College (CEPOL), the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA), the European Institute for Gender 
Equality (EIGE), the Executive Agency for Competitiveness and Innovation (EACI), the 
European Research Council Executive Agency (ERC) and the Research Executive Agency 
(REA). 
In the meantime, the ‘agencification frenzy’ has even reached the European Parliament, where 
certain potential new European agencies have recently been proposed. However, the proposal 
for an agency to promote Europe’s linguistic diversity
8 or to address the specific problems of 
the islands
9 did not make it.  
1.2  Evolution of the debate in the EU 
Because of the increasing scope of the Commission’s activities in the 80s, public alertness 
concerning the legitimacy and accountability of the Commission’s activities grew throughout 
the 90s. The Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties tried to address these issues. But they only 
managed to partially allay public concerns. By the end of the 90s, several crises and the outburst 
of a corruption scandal in the Commission discredited the trust in the functioning of the 
Community.
10 After the resignation of the Santer Commission in 1999, the Prodi Commission 
initiated the project of ‘Good Governance’ and ‘Better Lawmaking’.
11 It decided to refocus 
on its core tasks and use decentralised agencies to supervise the implementation process of 
                                                      
6 P. Craig, The Constitutionalization of Community Administration, New York University School of Law, 
New York, Jean Monnet Working Paper 3/03, 2003, pp. 6-8 (accessed on 10 April 2008, 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/03/030301.pdf).  
7 Reforming the Commission – A White Paper – Part I, European Commission, 5 April 2000, p. 5, COM 
(2000) 200 final/2. 
8 Written Question E-0604/03 by Bárbara Dührkop (PSE) to the Council, 3 March 2003 (OJ 2003 C 
280E/70). 
9 Written Question E-0331/03 by Joan Vallvé (ELDR) to the Commission, 10 February 2003 (OJ 2003 C 
222E/185). 
10 E. Vos, op. cit., pp. 1113-1115. 
11 See European Governance, A White Paper, European Commission, 25 July 2001, 35 p. COM (2001) 
428 final and European Governance: Better Lawmaking, European Commission, 5 June 2002, 6 p. COM 
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Community legislation.
12 As the number of agencies increased, the Commission realised that 
this would not alleviate citizens’ legitimacy concerns. Therefore, in 2002 it proposed the 
definition of an operational framework for European regulatory agencies.
13 A 2005 proposal for 
an inter-institutional agreement on such a framework
14 got bogged down and in 2008 the 
Commission signalled that it would withdraw its proposal and try to reopen the debate on an 
operating framework.
15 In the meantime, a framework for the statute of executive agencies was 
adopted in 2003.
16 
For a long time, there has been no explicit mention in the EC/EU Treaties of European 
agencies as independent decentralised Community bodies. This would be remedied by the 
Lisbon Treaty, which integrates the agencies into the Treaties. First, the Lisbon Treaty would 
introduce a horizontal amendment, replacing “institutions (and/or bodies)” with “institutions, 
bodies, offices or agencies”.
17 With this amendment, some general principles (e.g. the right of 
access of EU citizens to documents or the right to file complaints to the European Ombudsman) 
would apply explicitly to European agencies as well. Second, a number of specific amendments 
would be introduced, making general principles such as transparency, the protection of personal 
data and anti-fraud measures also applicable to agencies.
18 The most important of these specific 
amendments would formally empower the Court of Justice to review the legality of acts of 
agencies.
19 Finally, one agency, the EDA, would be specifically acknowledged by the Lisbon 
Treaty.
20 
2.  Defining European agencies 
2.1  What is a European agency: The lack of definition 
If all agencies are organs under European public law, there is no formal definition of what a 
European agency exactly is, nor is there any single legal framework on which all agencies are 
modelled. In general, the term ‘agency’ can be used to describe a variety of organisations that 
                                                      
12 European Governance, A White Paper, op. cit., pp. 23-24 (COM (2001) 428 final). 
13 Communication from the Commission. The Operating framework for the European Regulatory 
Agencies. European Commission, 11 December 2002, 14 p. (Hereafter: Communication: The Operating 
framework) (COM (2002) 718 final). 
14 Draft Interinstitutional Agreement on the operating framework for the European regulatory agencies. 
European Commission, 25 February 2005, 24 p. (Hereafter: Draft Institutional Agreement) (COM (2005) 
59 final). 
15 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: European Agencies 
– The Way Forward. European Commission, 11 March 2008, pp. 9-10. (Hereafter: Communication: 
European Agencies – The way Forward) (COM (2008) 135 final). 
16 Regulation (EC) 58/2003 laying down the statute for executive agencies to be entrusted with certain 
tasks in the management of Community programmes (OJ 2003 L 11/2-3). 
17 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community (OJ 2007 C 306/42, 44). 
18 Ibid. (OJ 2007 C 306/50, 51, 127). 
19 Ibid. (OJ 2007 C 306/109). 
20 Ibid. (OJ 2007 C 306/34). GOVERNANCE OF THE EU: THE REFORM DEBATE ON EUROPEAN AGENCIES REIGNITED | 5 
 
perform tasks of a governmental nature and that often exist outside the institutional 
framework.
21 The official website of the EU
22 states only that: 
A number of specialised and decentralised EU agencies have been established to 
support the EU Member States and their citizens. These agencies are an answer to a 
desire for geographical devolution and the need to cope with new tasks of a legal, 
technical and/or scientific nature.  
Based on some of the common features of agencies, a distinction can be made with other 
Community institutions and bodies, which in practice perform similar agency-like activities, act 
considerably autonomously, are situated outside the institutional structure but are not considered 
as agencies.  
Set up by means of secondary legislation, European agencies are fundamentally different from 
the Treaty-based institutions such as the European Central Bank (ECB) or the European 
Investment Bank (EIB). This is also the case for the oldest European agency, the Euratom 
Supply Agency, which originates directly from the Euratom Treaty.
23 This also means that a 
‘European’ international organisation such as the European Patent Office cannot be considered 
as a European agency, because it is not set up by secondary legislation.
24 
The fact that European agencies are endowed with a proper legal personality, meaning that 
the agency can enjoy all the legal capacities in a member state accorded to legal persons under 
that member state’s laws, excludes several other entities that do not have the same legal quality. 
An inter-institutional office such as European Personnel Selection Office, or a special office of 
the Commission such as the Joint Research Centre are thus not considered as being agencies.
25 
In recent years, the EU has set up several special partnership bodies, in which public and 
private sectors work together to stimulate research and economic development. These 
partnership bodies are not considered European agencies, because of their particular nature. 
European Joint Undertakings like the one for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy and 
the Single European Sky ATM Research for air traffic management (SESAR Programme) and 
the European Institute of Innovation and Technology are examples of such partnership bodies.
26 
However, it is important to note here that the European Parliament considers agencies as bodies 
that are set up by the Communities and thus as having a legal personality.
27 This in turn implies 
that the European Parliament does recognise bodies like the Joint Undertakings as agencies.  
                                                      
21 M. Everson and G. Majone, “Réforme institutionnelle: agences indépendantes, surveillance, 
coordination et contrôle procedural”, in O. De Schutter (ed.), La gouvernance dans l’Union européenne, 
Luxembourg, Commission européenne, 2001, p. 162. 
22 “Agencies of the EU” (accessed on 13 April 2008, http://europa.eu/agencies/index_en.htm).  
23 Article 52 of the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). Operational 
since 1960 until this day, the agency has as its task to ensure a regular and equitable supply of ores, 
source materials and special fissile materials to the member states. 
24 S. Griller and A. Orator, Empowering European Agencies – Or How to Tame the Sorcerer’s 
Apprentice, European University Institute, New Modes of Governance Policy Brief 22, Spring 2008, p. 2 
(accessed on 22 April 2008, http://www.eu-newgov.org/database/PUBLIC/Policy_Briefs/ 
NEWGOV_Policy_Brief_no22.pdf).  
25 Ibid., p. 2. 
26 Communication: European Agencies – The Way Forward, op. cit., p. 3 (COM (2008) 135 final). 
27 Regulation (EC, Euratom) 1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of 
the European Communities (OJ 2002 L248/13, 41). 6 | ANDOURA & TIMMERMAN 
 
2.2  Motives for the creation of European agencies 
The gradual expansion of policy competences of the EU has increased the need for specialised 
expertise in different policy areas. As the technical or scientific dimension is increasingly 
integrated into political decisions, a larger and systematic mobilisation of expertise and 
knowledge is required. The development of independent agencies indeed facilitates the use of 
scientific or technical experts outside the normal bureaucratic structure. 
Decentralised agencies remove some of the workload of the Commission as they take over 
some of its operational functions. This would give the Commission the possibility to 
concentrate more on its core functions and intensify the Commission’s political profile.
28 The 
division of labour between the Commission and the different agencies can also contribute to a 
better understanding of the EU. While the Commission remains responsible for the political 
and strategic guidelines, an agency responds to specific technical tasks. In addition, the presence 
of agencies in different member states can make ‘Europe’ more concrete and visible for the 
citizens.
29 A clearly identifiable agency that executes well-defined tasks, rather than a 
Commission unit or committee operating far away from the spotlights, contributes also to an 
enhanced transparency of the system.
30 
Greater policy consistency in the implementation of policies is achieved in two ways. First, 
agencies circumvent the increasing politicisation of the Commission and do not have to deal 
with political considerations.
31 Second, the permanent nature of agencies allows greater 
consistency than the often ad hoc nature of committees.
32 In turn, this increased policy 
consistency benefits the credibility of European regulatory policies.  
The institutionalised cooperation in networks set up by European agencies enhances trust and 
cooperation between the different national entities. These networks reduce the transaction 
costs compared to a situation whereby similar entities would operate at national level.
33 Another 
result of the networking with national administrations is the contribution to a uniform 
interpretation and implementation of Community law
34 and leads to administrative 
integration.
35  
Agencies can also provide an alternative to political integration if more direct routes towards 
integration are unacceptable. As a small discrete institution of a technical nature, well distinct 
from the Commission and often not situated in Brussels, an agency has several advantages in 
this sense. This reasoning stems from the neo-functionalist theory on integration.
36 
                                                      
28 E. Vos, op. cit., p. 1119. 
29 D. Gerardin and N. Petit, The Development of Agencies at EU and National Levels: Conceptual 
Analysis and Proposals for Reform, New York University School of Law, New York, Jean Monnet 
Working Paper 1/04, 2004, pp. 36-37 (accessed on 10 April 2008, 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/04/040101.pdf).  
30 E. Vos, op. cit., p. 1119. 
31 M. Everson and G. Majone, op. cit., pp. 140-142. 
32 R. Dehousse, “Regulation by Networks in the European Community: the Role of European agencies”, 
Journal of European Public Policy, 4, 2, June 1997, pp. 254-255, hereafter: Regulation by Networks. 
33 M. Everson and G. Majone, op. cit., p. 167. 
34 R. Dehousse, op. cit., pp. 255-257. 
35 A. Kreher, “Agencies in the European Community – a step towards administrative integration in 
Europe”, Journal of European Public Policy, 4, 2, June 1997, pp. 239-240. 
36 M. Shapiro, “The problems of independent agencies in the United States and the European Union”, 
Journal of European Public Policy, 4, 2, June 1997, p. 281. GOVERNANCE OF THE EU: THE REFORM DEBATE ON EUROPEAN AGENCIES REIGNITED | 7 
 
Finally, the creation of agencies has proven to be useful in times of crisis. Examples such as the 
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), which was set up in response to the BSE crisis and 
EMSA, which was created to enhance maritime safety in the aftermath of the sinking of the oil 
tanker Erika off the French coast in 1999, showed that crises can prove to be very fruitful 
moments for agencies. Besides the fact that specialised agencies help fill a void in the public 
administration, the (proposed) launch of a new agency provides Brussels with an instrument to 
show to European citizens that it is not just standing by doing nothing.
37 
2.3  What legal basis for the creation of European agencies? 
As mentioned above, the Treaty does not provide any specific legal basis to create agencies. In 
Article 4 of the Treaty of Rome, the four institutions are listed and it is stated that “each 
Institution shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty”.
38 This has 
been read and interpreted by some as a prohibition to create additional bodies.
39  
However, this has not prevented the delegation of powers to autonomous agencies. Twelve of 
the twenty-three agencies
40 under the EC Treaty have the same legal basis, namely Article 308 
of the EC Treaty,
41 which states: 
If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the 
operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community, and this 
Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously 
on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, take 
the appropriate measures. 
Since the third wave of agencies, new agencies are predominantly created on the basis of a 
specific Treaty provision instead of Article 308 EC. For example, the legal basis of EEA was 
Article 130s EC
42 which contains the aims of environmental protection, and ECHA is based on 
Article 95 EC, which relates to the internal market. The Commission has argued that this should 
logically be so “since the regulatory agency is an instrument of implementation of a specific 
Community policy”.
43 However, this vision does not go unchallenged. In 2004, the UK 
challenged the choice of Article 95 EC as the legal basis of the European Network and 
Information Security Agency (ENISA) before the European Court of Justice
44 and stated that 
Article 308 EC was the only possible legal basis. The Court ruled that the use of Article 95 EC 
was appropriate for ENISA, as it constituted a part of the normative context directed at 
completing the internal market in the area of electronic communications.  
                                                      
37 R.H. Van Ooik and W.T. Eijsbouts, “De wonderbaarlijke vermenigvuldiging van Europese 
agentschappen. Verklaring, Analyse, Perspectief”, SEW Tijdschrift voor Europees en Economisch Recht, 
54, 3, March 2006, p. 104. 
38 Article 4 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, p. 16. 
39 K. Lenaerts, “Regulating the regulatory process: ‘delegation of powers’ in the European Community”, 
European Law Review, 18, 1993, p. 23. 
40 CEDEFOP, EUROFOUND, ETF, EMCDDA, EMEA, OHIM, EU-OSHA, CPVO, CdT, FRA, EAR 
and GSA. 
41 See article 308 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (OJ 
2006 C321 E/179). 
42 This is currently Article 175 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community (OJ 2006 C321 E/124-125). 
43 Communication: The Operating framework, op. cit., p. 7 (COM (2002) 718 final). 
44 Case C-217/04, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. European Parliament and 
Council of the European Union, 2 May 2006, par 60. 8 | ANDOURA & TIMMERMAN 
 
Agency creation based on specific Treaty provisions has three consequences that have a bearing 
on institutional relations. First, creating an agency based on a specific legal Treaty basis results 
in a more flexible legislative procedure in the Council, because the majority voting procedure 
replaces the unanimity voting process. Second, the proposed agency’s range of activities will 
probably become narrower in the case of a specific Treaty provision than in the case of Article 
308 EC. This is because in the latter case the Council has a large margin of discretion over the 
nature of the Community action it will adopt.
45 Third, the creation of an agency based on a 
specific legal basis requires the co-decision procedure, whereas Article 308 EC only requires 
parliamentary consultation. The power of the European Parliament has thus increased since 
2000, because it must come to an agreement with the Council on the creation of an agency.
46 
2.4  What typology: Executive and regulatory agencies 
The overview of the different phases in the creation of European agencies demonstrates that 
there has been a remarkable multiplication of the number of European agencies in recent years. 
The lack of a clear and uniform legal framework for European agencies has caused a large 
heterogeneity in appellations, tasks, organisational structure, relations with the other 
institutions, funding, etc. This makes it difficult to design a clear typology in which all agencies 
would fit. In EC law, distinction is only made between two broad types of agencies: executive 
and regulatory agencies. 
2.4.1 Executive  agencies 
In the aftermath of the resignation of the Santer Commission in 1999, Prodi wanted the 
Commission to refocus on its core functions. Delegating tasks to other bodies such as executive 
agencies therefore seemed to provide the solution. The management of Community 
programmes
47 was the first area to be subjected to this new approach. The externalisation of 
management tasks was envisaged by delegating executive responsibilities either to Community 
public bodies (devolution) or to national public bodies (decentralisation).
48 Those Community 
public bodies that became responsible for the management of Community programmes were 
the executive agencies. Those last are created by the Commission to perform the tasks of 
implementing and managing Community programmes.  
The statute of all executive agencies is defined by the same legal framework, notably 
Regulation (EC) 58/2003.
49 The Commission plays a central role in the creation, organisation 
and structure of executive agencies, because they are charged with tasks that enter into the 
sphere of the Commission’s competences, notably on the implementation of rules and the 
budget.
50  
                                                      
45 D. Gerardin and N. Petit, op. cit., pp. 42-43. 
46 Eight agencies have been set up under co-decision: EFSA, EMSA, EASA, ENISA, ECDC, ERA, 
ECHA and EIGE. 
47 Some examples of Community programmes are Erasmus, Leonardo da Vinci, Media and Europe for 
Citizens (managed by EACEA), Marco Polo (EACI) and Public Health Programme (PHEA). 
48 Communication from the Commission on the Externalisation of the management of Community 
programmes including presentation of a framework regulation for a new type of executive agency, 
European Commission, 13 December 2000, p. 4 (COM (2000) 337 final). 
49 Regulation (EC) 58/2003 (OJ 2003 L 11/2-3). 
50 See articles 202 and 274 of the Consolidated Versions of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community (OJ 2006 C321 E/135, 168). GOVERNANCE OF THE EU: THE REFORM DEBATE ON EUROPEAN AGENCIES REIGNITED | 9 
 
No discretionary powers can be delegated to an executive agency, meaning that agencies cannot 
take any political choice in their actions. The agency must be located in the same place as the 
Commission, so in practice, all executive agencies are to be found in Brussels. The lifetime of 
an executive agency is limited but extension of the mandate is possible. In 2008, 6 executive 
agencies were operative: Executive Agency for the Public Health Programme (PHEA), 
Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA), Trans-European Transport 
Network Executive Agency (TEN-TEA), Executive Agency for Competitiveness and 
Innovation (EACI), European Research Council Executive Agency (ERC) and Research 
Executive Agency (REA). 
2.4.2 Regulatory  agencies 
Regulatory agencies constitute the largest group of agencies,
51 operating in a wide variety of 
fields and are to a certain extent actively involved in the regulation of a specific sector. 
Regulatory agencies are operational under the three different pillars of the European Union. 
With 23 out of 29 regulatory agencies created under the EC legal framework, the first pillar 
accounts for the bulk of the regulatory agencies. The European Union’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy and the Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters, the two other 
pillars of the EU, comprise three regulatory agencies each.
52  
Contrary to executive agencies, there are no general rules governing the creation and operation 
of regulatory agencies. They were set up on an ad hoc basis, rather than via a coherent 
administrative and/or regulatory method. Consequently, large differences exist between them 
when it comes to their functions, organisational structure and funding provisions.  
Being ‘regulatory’ does not mean that every agency of this kind can automatically adopt 
binding legal rules or decisions. In 2005 the Commission specified:
53  
Regulatory activities do not necessary involve the adoption of legal acts. They may 
also involve measures of a more incentive nature, such as co-regulation, self-
regulation, recommendations, referral to the scientific authority, networking and 
pooling good practice, evaluating the application and implementation of rules, etc. It 
therefore follows that a European ‘regulatory’ agency does not necessarily have the 
power to enact binding legal norms. 
2.5  Constitutive elements of European agencies  
2.5.1 Mandate 
Agencies are generally provided with a limited mandate that defines tasks that are technical, 
scientific or managerial in nature. This limited mandate results from the anti-delegation bias 
following the strict application of the Meroni doctrine (cf. 2.5.4). 
Most agencies have also been given a permanent character. Exceptions are ENISA and the 
agencies classified as executive agencies by the Commission. In some cases, an evaluation by 
the Commission of an agency’s activities can lead to a proposal to adapt or even close down the 
agency.  
                                                      
51 Currently there are 28 regulatory agencies functioning, 1 in preparation and proposals for 2 more, see 
Annex. 
52 For a comprehensive overview: see annex.  
53 Draft Interinstitutional Agreement, op. cit., p. 4 (COM (2005) 59 final). 10 | ANDOURA & TIMMERMAN 
 
2.5.2  Tasks attributed to agencies  
European agencies assume a wide range of different functions. In order to shed some more 
light on the issue, it is interesting to categorise the agencies according to the tasks that have 
been attributed to them. Four categories can be distinguished.  
The first type of agency can be referred to as the regulatory model. All these agencies served 
for the completion of the internal market. A first group, constituted by OHIM, CPVO, EMEA 
and ECHA, acts as an administrative regulator and provides certificates and licences. A second 
group of agencies is predominantly active in the promotion of interoperability and the guarantee 
of minimal safety. The EASA, EFSA, ERA and EMSA can be distinguished as such. The two 
agencies currently proposed, the European Electronic Communications Market Authority and 
the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators also belong to this subcategory, since the 
promotion of interoperability is one of their tasks. 
The second category is composed of agencies entrusted with an observatory role. They have to 
collect, analyse, process and distribute reliable information to the Community institutions, the 
member states and the general public. Agencies of this type are EEA, EMCDDA, ECDC, 
ENISA, European Union Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) and the EIGE. A common feature 
of these agencies is that they rely on expert committees, in order to assure the scientific or 
technical accuracy of their advice or opinions.  
The third category is referred to as the cooperative model. It is composed of agencies operating 
in the area of social policy, aiming to promote social dialogue at the EU level. Three agencies 
belong to this group: EUROFOUND, CEDEFOP and EU-OSHA. A particular characteristic of 
these agencies is the tripartite management board, in which the social partners are represented 
besides representatives of the member states and the Commission.  
Finally, the agencies in charge of operational activities constitute the executive model. They 
perform strictly technical tasks and are therefore sometimes considered as subcontractors or 
service providers for the Commission.
54 They are therefore entrusted by the Commission with 
limited non-discretionary powers for the management of Community programmes. The ETF, 
CdT, EUROPOL, EAR, EUROJUST, GSA, FRONTEX, CFCA, CEPOL, PHEA, EACEA, 
TEN-TEA, Intelligent Energy Executive Agency (IEEA), ERC and REA belong to this 
category.  
It should be clear that this typology is not absolute. The tasks attributed to an agency are often 
diverse, including both an observatory or informative role and a regulatory role. Therefore, it is 
possible to place some agencies in different categories, e.g. EFSA and EMSA would also fit in 
the category of agencies with an observatory role, while ENISA not only has an observatory 
role, but can also be classified as regulatory because it contributes to the improvement of 
interoperability. 
2.5.3 Organisational  structure 
Agencies are characterised by a dual organisational structure. On the one hand, a director
55 is 
responsible for the day-to-day management, budgetary and staff matters and he is the legal 
representative of the agency. On the other hand, the administrative board
56 is responsible for the 
oversight of the director, lays down the general guidelines and adopts the (annual) work 
                                                      
54 D. Gerardin and N. Petit, op. cit., p. 45. 
55 Also referred to as executive director or president in other agencies. 
56 Also referred to as management or governing board, governing council or steering board in other 
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programme and final budget. But there are large differences between agencies in the way in 
which this structure is operating. The size of administrative boards varies substantially.
57 This 
raises questions about whether optimal conditions are created to allow the performance of tasks. 
Coherence is also lacking when it comes to the duration of the mandates of both the members of 
the administrative boards and the directors.
58 
The linguistic regime is another source of incoherence between the European agencies.
59 For 
reasons of efficiency, agencies have generally been using a limited number of languages. The 
limitation on the number of languages impinges on the right of citizens to express themselves in 
one of the official languages of the institutions.
60 But member states also have the right to 
correspond with the institutions in their own language. Some member states may be negatively 
affected if they have to use technical documents produced by agencies, which are only available 
in a few languages.
61  
Agencies are often assisted by scientific or technical  committees
62 and operate within an 
expert network
63 to ensure that the measures taken or proposed by the agency are objective and 
relevant.
64 For some agencies, the constituent regulation explicitly provides for the creation of a 
specific network (e.g. European Environment Information and Observation Network), while for 
others there is only a more general task put upon the agency to promote European networking in 
the field of its activities. Some agencies also comprise coordinating bodies composed of 
representatives from national competent authorities to assist the directors.
65 
With regard to human resources, each agency enjoys managerial autonomy. All European 
agencies combined employ between 4,000 and 7,000 staff. Nevertheless, in terms of human 
resources, there are huge differences between one agency and another. The average size of an 
agency is 157 staff members, but OHIM employs some 650 persons, while there are only 20 
                                                      
57 The number of members ranges between 14 in EFSA and 84 in CEDEFOP and EUROFOUND. This 
high number is due to the fact that these 2 agencies are active in social policy, requiring representation of 
the social partners of every member state in the governing board, besides representatives of the member 
states themselves and the Commission. 
58 Depending on the agency, a mandate varies between 30 months (e.g. EAR) and 5 years. To complicate 
matters further, the duration of the mandate of an agency’s director and its members of the administrative 
boards sometimes diverge (e.g. ECHA, where a director has a 5 year mandate and the members of the 
administrative board a 4 year mandate). 
59 In some cases, no mention at all is made of what languages are to be used (e.g. EFSA). In others, a 
simple reference is made to the fact that the rules governing the languages of the European Communities 
shall apply (e.g. EUROFOUND). It can be left to the administrative board to determine the language 
arrangements, provided that a unanimous agreement is reached on the issue (e.g. EAR). The legislator 
defined the linguistic regime in some cases himself (e.g. OHIM: English, French, German, Italian and 
Spanish). 
60 See Article 21 of the Consolidated Versions of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (OJ 
2006 C321 E/51). 
61 E. Vos, op. cit., pp. 1128-1129.  
62 Examples of such committees are the Committee for Orphan Medicinal Products (COMP) for the 
EMEA, the Advisory Forum of the ECDC or the Scientific Committee of the EEA. 
63 Examples of such expert networks are the European Environment Information and Observation 
Network (Eionet) for the EEA, the European Information Network on Drugs and Drug Addiction (Reitox) 
for the EMCDDA, and the Fundamental Rights Platform for the FRA. 
64 D. Gerardin and N. Petit, op. cit. , pp. 41-42.  
65 For example the Advisory Forum in the EFSA. 12 | ANDOURA & TIMMERMAN 
 
persons working at EIGE.
66 A breakdown by nationality showed similar proportionality as in the 
Commission, including a general over-representation of nationals from the host country.
67 An 
overview of the staff statutes revealed that more than three quarters of agency personnel are 
temporary and contract agents. The Commission on the other hand employs over 80% officials 
and very few temporary agents compared to the agencies. The reason for this inconsistency is 
that agencies can eventually be wound up and the statute of a temporary agent is more flexible 
than that of an official when it comes to dismissal.
68 
In order to ensure consistent staff policy and to avoid differences regarding the recruitment 
methodology and the career prospects amongst the agencies, the staff policy has to correspond 
with the Staff Regulations of Officials and Conditions of Employment of other Servants of the 
European Communities. However, the requirement to comply with all the rules and procedures 
is very burdensome to agencies, particularly for small ones.
69 
2.5.4 Decision-making  power and procedures 
Decision-making power  
There is a considerable asymmetry in the decision-making powers attributed to the different 
agencies. The majority of agencies only have a supportive role towards the institutions and the 
member states and lack genuine power.  
Four agencies have the capability to take decisions that are legally binding to third parties. 
This concerns OHIM for the registration of Community trade marks, CPVO for plant variety 
rights, EASA in aviation and ECHA for chemical substances.  
Four agencies have quasi decision-making power: EMEA, EFSA, EMSA and ERA. They 
assist the Commission on highly technical or scientific matters by providing it with advice and 
recommendations or by performing inspections. The Commission leans heavily on the agency’s 
expertise when it has to make a decision. In practice, these agencies have quasi decision-making 
power, because the Commission is almost always inclined to follow the agency’s conclusions.
70 
The delegation of power to agencies has been subject to strict conditions, which stem from 
case law of the European Court of Justice. In 1958, the Court ruled in the Meroni-case
71 that the 
delegation of power could only be allowed if a strict set of conditions was met. First, the Court 
stated that a delegating authority “could not confer upon the authority receiving the delegation 
powers different from those which the delegating authority itself received under the Treaty”. 
Second, the Court stated that “a delegation of powers cannot be presumed (…) the delegating 
authority must take an express decision transferring them”.
72 Third, delegation is only 
permissible if it “involves clearly defined executive powers the exercise of which can, therefore, 
                                                      
66 F. Pereyra, “Human Resources Management: the Bureaucratic Constraints”, contribution at the 
European Agencies seminar: Fashion or Necessity? EU agencies in between EU institutions and member 
states, Maastricht, European Institute of Public Administration, 26 May 2008. 
67 F. Jones, Agencies: Origin of Tasks, Local Conditions and Staffing, European Parliament, Budgetary 
Affairs Committee, 17 October 2007, pp. 11-13 (PE 381.092). 
68 F. Pereyra, op. cit. 
69 Ibid. 
70 M.-Th. Hermagne, “Rapport d’Information fait au nom de la delegation pour l’Union européenne sur 
les agencies européennes”, Sénat, No. 58, 27 October 2005, p. 8.  
71 Case 9/56, Meroni & Co., Industrie Metallurgiche, SpA v. High Authority of the European Coal and 
Steel Community, 1958, p. 150. 
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be subject to strict review in the light of objective criteria determined by the delegating 
authority”.
73 Finally, the Court ruled against the delegation of discretionary powers
74 and 
referred to the balance of power between European institutions as “a fundamental guarantee 
granted by the Treaty in particular to the undertakings and associations of undertakings to which 
it applies” to justify this restrictive position.
75 
Although given in the framework of the ECSC Treaty, this ruling is generally considered to 
remain valid within the wider Community legal order.
76 The Community Case Law confirmed 
that the fundamental principles of the Meroni Case Law continue to apply.
77 
This was also confirmed in the approach taken by the Commission regarding the creation of an 
agency. In the White Paper on European Governance,
78 a list of conditions was given to ensure 
that the balance of power between the institutions would be guaranteed. According to the 
Commission: 
Agencies can be granted the power to take individual decisions in specific areas but 
cannot adopt general regulatory measures. In particular, they can be granted decision-
making power in areas where a single public interest predominates and the tasks to be 
carried out require particular technical expertise (e.g. air safety); Agencies cannot be 
given responsibilities for which the Treaty has conferred a direct power of decision on 
the Commission (e.g., in the area of competition policy); Agencies cannot be granted 
decision-making power in areas in which they would have to arbitrate between 
conflicting public interests, exercise political discretion or carry out complex economic 
assessments; Agencies must be subject to an effective system of supervision and 
control. 
This Commission approach in correspondence with the Meroni ruling, was confirmed in various 
other documents
79 and is still valid up to this day. In 2008, the Commission
80 noted: 
There are clear and strict limits to the autonomous power of regulatory agencies in the 
current Community legal order. Agencies cannot be given the power to adopt general 
regulatory measures. They are limited to taking individual decisions in specific areas 
where a defined technical expertise is required, under clearly and precisely defined 
conditions and without genuine discretionary power. In addition, the agencies cannot 
be entrusted with powers which may affect the responsibilities which the Treaty has 
explicitly conferred on the Commission.  
                                                      
73 Ibid., p. 152. 
74 R. Dehousse, Misfits: EU Law and the Transformation of European Governance, New York University 
School of Law, New York, Jean Monnet Working Paper 2/02, 2002, pp. 11-12 (accessed on 10 April 
2008, http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/02/020201.rtf).  
75 Case 9/56, Meroni v. High Authority, op. cit., p. 152. 
76 K. Lenaerts, op. cit., p. 41. 
77 S. Griller and A. Orator, Meroni Revisited – Empowering European Agencies between Efficiency and 
Legitimacy, Vienna, Europainstitut, 31 May 2007, pp. 6-8, hereafter: Meroni Revisited – Empowering 
European Agencies (accessed on 16 April 2008, http://www.eu-newgov.org/database/DELIV/ 
D04D40_WP_Meroni_Revisited.pdf).  
78 European Governance. A White Paper, op. cit., p. 24 (COM (2001) 428 final). 
79 See Communication: The Operating framework, op. cit., p. 8. (COM (2002) 718 final) and the Draft 
Interinstitutional Agreement, op. cit., p. 5 (COM (2005) 59 final). 
80 Communication: European Agencies – The Way Forward, op. cit., p. 5 (COM (2008) 135 final). 14 | ANDOURA & TIMMERMAN 
 
Procedures 
In order to guarantee an agency’s independence, the director is responsible for the operational 
decisions related to the day-to-day functioning of the agency. The director is supervised by the 
administrative board, which also adopts the work programme and final budget and decides on 
the rules of procedure. Decisions are taken by a two-thirds majority in the administrative board, 
although simple or absolute majority applies in some agencies, while qualified majority is the 
rule in agencies active in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy (ISS, EUSC and 
EDA).  
2.5.5 Funding 
The majority of agencies are wholly or partly financed by Community funds. The European 
regulatory agencies operate an annual budget of more or less € 1.1 billion, of which some €559 
million is contributed by the Community budget.
81 The general Financial Regulation applies to 
all agencies that receive Community funding. It contains rules concerning the establishment 
plan of agencies, the application of the framework financial regulation for agencies, the 
consolidation of accounts with those of the Commission, and the discharge by the European 
Parliament.
82 The framework financial regulation lays down common rules for the establishment 
and implementation of agencies’ budgets, including control aspects.
83 
Only five agencies are to some extent self-financing, because they generate revenue through 
fees paid for services rendered. The OHIM and the CPVO rely completely on self-financing. 
The EMEA and EASA receive financial contributions from both the Community and the 
industry. The operation of CdT is funded by payments from its clients, which are in fact the 
Community institutions and other agencies. Finally there are four agencies funded by the 
member states only, notably those in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy and 
EUROPOL. 
2.6 Control  of  agencies 
The question of the accountability of agencies can be subdivided into five elements: political, 
judicial, financial, administrative and public accountability.  
European agencies have only a limited political accountability. Only in a few cases, the 
constituent regulations provide the European Parliament with the possibility to invite the 
director for a hearing before his appointment or to report on the agency’s activities.
84 Given this 
evolving trend, the influence of the European Parliament seems to be growing. However, the 
European Parliament has no formal means of blocking the appointment. It can only give 
negative advice after which the decision is left to the administrative board. More systematic 
parliamentary scrutiny could prove useful, because it would oblige agencies to give insight into 
and reasoned explanations of their work and decisions.
85 
                                                      
81 Figures are only for agencies created under the EC Treaty and under Police and Judicial Cooperation in 
Criminal Matters excluding EUROPOL (Communication: European Agencies – The Way Forward, op. 
cit., p. 4, COM (2008) 135 final). 
82 Regulation (EC, Euratom) 1605/2002 (OJ 2002 L248/13, 41). 
83 Regulation (EC, Euratom) 2343/2002 on the framework Financial Regulation for the bodies referred to 
in Article 185 of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable 
to the general budget of the European Communities (OJ 2002 L 357/72-90). 
84 This is the case for: EASA, ENISA, ERA, FRONTEX and ECHA.  
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The principal mechanism to guarantee judicial accountability of agencies is a review of 
legality of the agencies’ acts. All acts taken by European agencies, capable of producing binding 
legal effects, are challengeable before the Court of Justice of the European Communities on the 
basis of Article 230 of the EC Treaty.
86 Some agencies are provided with an internal chamber 
for the review of legality of the adopted acts. Decisions of such an internal Board of Appeal can 
be challenged before the Court of Justice. This procedure applies for OHIM, CPVO, ECHA and 
EASA, which are the agencies with decision-making powers. Regarding executive agencies, 
administrative appeal is treated by the Commission before a possible infringement action is filed 
at the Court of Justice. If the Commission concludes that an act is unlawful, it can demand a 
revision or annulment.  
Several control mechanisms exist to make agencies financially accountable. First, the 
European Parliament has significant power over agencies through its budget and budgetary 
discharge procedure as many agencies depend completely or partly on Community funding. 
Since 2006, the inter-institutional agreement on budgetary discipline and sound financial 
management offers some potential influence for the Parliament on the creation of new agencies 
which are under the budgetary influence and control of the budgetary authority.
87 Second, the 
Court of Auditors is empowered to examine the revenues of agencies in order to determine 
whether the annual accounts are reliable and if the transactions are legal and regular.
88 Third, 
agencies are increasingly submitted to the control of the European Anti-Fraud Office and the 
financial controller of the Commission. 
The administrative accountability is increasingly safeguarded by the European Ombudsman, 
who has the power to investigate complaints of maladministration in agencies. Another way in 
which agencies subject themselves to administrative control is by agreeing on a code of conduct 
(e.g. EDA’s Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement).
89 
Direct public control is carried out by the stakeholders who operate in the network set up to 
assist agencies. In some cases, stakeholders have been given a seat in the administrative board 
(e.g. ERA).
90 
Transparency of the functioning of public institutions is also an important factor that 
contributes to its accountability. In order to ensure openness, a general right of access to 
documents of the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament was provided in the 
                                                      
86 See Article 230 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (OJ 
2006 C321 E/146). Despite the fact that acts of agencies are not explicitly mentioned, the Court applied a 
broad interpretation of the acts reviewable under the article by stating that all acts adopted by institutions 
may be reviewed by the Court. (Case 294/83, Parti Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v. European Parliament, 1986) 
The Lisbon Treaty would remedy this formal issue and introduce an explicit reference to agencies acts 
(Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community (OJ 2007 C 306/109). However, it is impossible to challenge the opinion of an agency, 
because this is only a preparatory act and not a final decision, which is capable of producing a binding 
legal effect (Case T-326/99 Fern Oliviere v. Commission of the European Communities and European 
Agency for the Evaluation of Medecinal Products, 18 December 2003, par. 53). 
87 See Article 47 of the Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council and 
the Commission on budgetary discipline and sound financial management (OJ 2006 C 139/8). 
88 See Article 248 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (OJ 
2006 C321 E/151). 
89 E. Vos, “European agencies: Delegation of Powers and Control”, contribution at the European 
Agencies seminar: Fashion or Necessity? EU agencies in between EU institutions and member states, 
Maastricht, European Institute of Public Administration, 26 May 2008. 
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EC Treaty.
91 The lack of explicit reference to the obligation of European agencies to 
communicate their documents was resolved by Regulation (EC) 1049/2001.
92 An explicit 
reference was inserted in the Lisbon Treaty, which extends the general right of access to 
documents to agencies as well.
93 The degree of transparency of European agencies is not always 
ideal, particularly where committees play a major role in the functioning of the agency.  
2.7  Relations with EU Institutions, member states and other actors 
2.7.1  Relations with EU Institutions 
Agencies have a particular position in the institutional triangle between the Council, 
Commission and European Parliament. The position of European agencies towards the 
institutions reflects the institutional equilibrium between the Community interests (Commission 
and Parliament) and the national interest (Council), but neither has direct influence on the day-
to-day functioning of an agency. 
The Council’s influence is embodied by the administrative board, in which every member state 
has generally one representative.
94 The Council is overrepresented in the administrative board 
compared to the limited Commission representation
95 and the quasi-inexistent Parliamentary 
representation.
96 Through the administrative board, the Council can thus keep a general 
oversight over the agency, given that the appointment of the director, the approval of the work 
programme and adoption of the final budget go through the administrative board. 
However, the Commission can counterbalance the Council to some extent. For the nomination 
of the director, the Commission can propose candidates or select a director from a shortlist 
composed by the administrative board. In most agencies, the Commission has an advisory role 
on the work programme.  
The relationship between the European Parliament and the European agencies is one of 
growing mutual interaction. On the one hand, there are the aspects of political and financial 
control from the European Parliament over an agency and the powers deriving from the co-
decision procedure on the creation of a new agency. On the other hand, closer ties are mutually 
beneficial. The European Parliament generates more insight into the functioning of agencies 
through the regular visits on site, the reporting by the directors in the specialised parliamentary 
committees and in some cases, through the feedback of its representative in the administrative 
board. It should be noted that although appointed by the European Parliament, this person is 
chosen on the basis of expertise and is never an active member of the European Parliament. So 
as a member of the administrative board, he does not formally represent the European 
                                                      
91 See Article 255 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (OJ 
2006 C321 E/157).  
92 Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission 
documents (OJ 2001 L 145/43). 
93 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community (OJ 2007 C 306/43, 50). 
94 In the case of EFSA (14 members) and the EIGE (19 members) the board consists of a fixed and 
limited number of members. In the case of FRA, and previously EUMC, it is explicitly stated that the 
member state’s representative should be independent from that member state. 
95 The Commission’s representation varies between one member without the voting rights to 6 members. 
96 In some cases, Parliament can assign some independent experts, who are not formally representing the 
European Parliament, but have to report back on the functioning of the agency in the European 
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Parliament. Furthermore, agencies can provide the European Parliament with technical 
knowledge which the small parliamentary staff is unable to deliver. For an agency, closer 
contacts with the European Parliament are beneficial because it means becoming less dependent 
on the other institutions, particularly in budgetary matters.
97 
2.7.2  Relations with member states 
Because of the regulatory nature of some agencies, member states have tried to keep a margin of 
control over those agencies through their overrepresentation in the administrative boards to the 
detriment of the Commission. Besides providing assistance to the Commission, a large number 
of agencies have the explicit task to do so to the member states as well. 
The creation of a European regulatory agency does not necessarily lead to a transfer of 
competences at European level. Rather than replacing equivalent national authorities, most 
European agencies have to create and coordinate an expert network comprising the relevant 
national entities. Agencies have thus become the pivotal element in a network of national bodies 
(e.g. ERA).
98 Only in the case of EASA, a number of tasks is withdrawn from member state 
level and are executed at Community level. The agency issues, on behalf of member states, a 
number of certificates related to airworthiness and environmental compliance.  
2.7.3  Relations with third actors 
The task of most agencies is to enhance the networking of the different national bodies that 
operate in the same field. But these networks are sometimes open to third actors as well. Non 
governmental organisations, international organisations or national bodies from non-member 
states can all be included in such networks. For instance, the regulation establishing EEA 
provides for the set-up of a European Environment Information and Observation Network, in 
which it should cooperate with the main component elements of national information networks, 
specialised European institutions (Joint Research Centre and Eurostat) and with international 
organisations (the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, the European 
Space Agency, the Council of Europe, the United Nations Environment Programme, the 
International Energy Agency, the World Meteorological Organisation and the International 
Atomic Energy Agency).  
In some cases, third countries can also join the agency itself, rather than participate only in the 
network constructed and supported by the agency. In particular, participation of candidate 
member states in agencies has been developed as an instrument to help them familiarise 
themselves with the Community acquis.
99 At the Luxembourg European Council in 1997, 
participation of candidate member states in European agencies and Community programmes 
was made part of a pre-accession strategy, to contribute to the symbolic, practical and 
operational integration of the candidate member states.
100 Participation of third countries has 
different consequences for the decision-making of agencies. In some agencies, third countries 
                                                      
97 F. Jacobs, “The European Parliament and the Role of the European agencies: Perspectives & 
Experiences”, contribution at the European Agencies seminar: Fashion or Necessity? EU agencies in 
between EU institutions and member states, Maastricht, European Institute of Public Administration, 27 
May 2008. 
98 M. Everson and G. Majone, op. cit., pp. 162-163. 
99 Communication: European Agencies – The Way Forward, op. cit., p. 5 (COM (2008) 135 final). 
100 Presidency Conclusions, Luxembourg European Council of 12 and 13 December 1997. Council of the 
European Union, Brussels (accessed on 6 May 2008, 
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can have membership with the full or partial voting rights, while in others they are only given 
the status of observer without the right to vote. 
The ETF has a particular relationship with third countries, since one of its tasks is to promote 
and support the reforms in the field of vocational training in EU partner countries.  
The social partners play an important role in CEDEFOP, EUROFOUND and EU-OSHA. 
These agencies have a tripartite management board, which means that the social partners are 
represented alongside representatives of the member states and the Commission. 
3. Main  Issues 
Delegating certain tasks and powers from the European treaty-based institutions in general and 
the Commission in particular to autonomous decentralised bodies – the EU agencies - evokes a 
number of contentious issues. Concerns are being raised with regard to the legitimacy and 
accountability of their actions, but also the anarchic process in which these agencies were 
created, which has led to a counterproductive heterogeneity of the whole system.  
3.1 Accountability 
Several European agencies, particularly regulatory agencies, can take decisions that have 
substantial consequences. In light of their autonomous status, the question of accountability 
arises; to whom are they answerable? It is in fact difficult to find the right balance between the 
necessary independence that agencies should enjoy in executing their tasks on the one hand and 
the required democratic control over their activities on the other hand. 
European regulatory agencies are not directly accountable to the general public. Therefore it is 
important that there is a solid system of control in place that prevents an agency from 
sidestepping the tasks assigned to it. The oversight mechanisms in place for European agencies 
are numerous and have evolved over time. As mentioned above, the Commission, Council, 
European Parliament and European Court of Justice are empowered to keep European agencies 
politically, financially and judicially accountable for their activities. Throughout the years, other 
bodies have been involved in the oversight activities as well, such as the Court of Auditors, the 
European Anti-Fraud Office and the financial controller of the Commission. This is a positive 
evolution, which guarantees that European agencies are performing the tasks attributed to them 
in the interest of the Community. 
On the other hand, operational independence is an important prerequisite in the functioning of 
European agencies, because it allows them to perform their tasks free from external pressures 
and to operate in the general interest. Some argue that the problem-solving capacity of 
independent regulatory agencies is better than that of a public authority, because agencies are 
freed from political bias and are concerned only with issues of technical nature.
101 In practice, 
the member states and the Commission directly or indirectly influence the functioning of 
agencies, e.g. by the powers granted to them in the nomination process for the administrative 
board and the directors.
102 Agencies are also exposed to private interests of industry or other 
stakeholders, but this problem of capture is a general phenomenon to regulatory bodies and 
there seems little reason to assume that agencies would be more vulnerable to it than the 
Commission.
103 
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A way to remedy this conundrum is to provide an agency with an internal structure and a set 
of procedures that clearly limit its functions and powers. Such a clear mandate forces the 
agency to focus on its principal task of technical or scientific nature and makes external pressure 
less effective. Because political or private interests are excluded as much as possible in this 
way, the only way the Commission, member states or pressure groups can influence the 
decision-making process is by presenting information and convincing arguments.
104 Together 
with the oversight mechanisms, these are the best guarantees of control over and independence 
of those decentralised bodies.  
3.2 Legitimacy 
From a democratic point of view, the autonomous status of European agencies raises questions 
about the legitimacy of their action, particularly in the case of independent European regulatory 
agencies.  
Too much independence evokes the critique of technocracy, the situation whereby experts 
rather than elected representatives take the upper hand in the decision-making process. The 
issue of technocracy is particularly relevant as regards the agencies with quasi decision-making 
power. Although these agencies formally operate in support of the Commission, they have 
substantial powers. The problem is that they are not responsible at all for the final decision, 
because the formal decision and responsibility rest with the Commission. The Commission is in 
practice almost always inclined to follow the agency’s proposal, because of the technical or 
scientific content of the matter. For instance, an agency like EMEA de facto dominates the 
decision-making process, because a producer applying for a marketing authorisation has to go 
directly to EMEA, and not to the Commission, leaving EMEA inevitably in a strong position to 
set the stage in the decision-making process.
105 
The  insufficient participation of external stakeholders in the decision-making process of 
European agencies is another important issue of legitimacy. A more systematic participation of 
representatives from the civil society, professional bodies and economic operators would 
enhance the legitimacy of an agency’s acts. Furthermore, increased participation would reduce 
the asymmetry of information between the regulatory agencies and economic operators, 
guarantee a better evaluation of the potential consequences and thus improve the acceptance of 
decisions.
106 
3.3 Heterogeneity 
Every regulatory agency was based on an ad hoc approach, resulting in a subsequent lack of 
coherence. This situation suggests that a well-considered approach has never been developed. 
The consequence thereof regards the large divergences between agencies when it comes to 
organisational structure, tasks, decision-making powers and procedures, funding, and relations 
with the EU Institutions. The lack of a common framework for regulatory agencies causes 
confusion and hampers the understanding of the entire system of agencies.  
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Despite the numerous Commission statements and attempts to bring about a common 
framework for regulatory agencies,
107 the reality is such that the Commission has not been 
coherent on the issue itself. In particular, the ‘regulatory concept’ is misleading and confusing, 
because in reality only a limited number of regulatory agencies have the power to adopt legally 
binding regulatory measures, while some other so-called ‘regulatory agencies’ only perform 
observatory or executive tasks. Since 2001, there has been a doubling in the number of 
European agencies and the Commission now finds itself confronted with this inadequate 
differentiation. By holding on to it, the distinction between executive and regulatory agencies 
has become a source of confusion rather than a help to interpret the system of European 
agencies. 
In 2002, the Commission tried to clarify the situation,
108 explaining that “regulatory agencies are 
required to be actively involved in the executive function by enacting instruments which help to 
regulate a specific sector”. This formulation implied that regulatory agencies do not necessarily 
need to adopt binding decisions. In 2005, a more elaborate explanation of the ‘regulatory 
concept’ stated explicitly that: 
Regulatory activities do not necessary involve the adoption of legal acts. They may 
also involve measures of a more incentive nature, such as co-regulation, self-
regulation, recommendations, referral to the scientific authority, networking and 
pooling good practice, evaluating the application and implementation of rules.
109 
Despite such clarifications about the regulatory concept, it remains, certainly at first sight, an 
‘easy-to-misinterpret’ concept.  
Neither has the Commission been communicating coherently on European agencies. The 
unclear and confusing terminology used by the Commission to distinguish the main regulatory 
agencies from the executive agencies has aggravated the situation. In particular, the 
Commission has been very inconsistent when it attempted to make a functional typology of the 
existing regulatory agencies. Both in 2002 and 2005, it discerned three categories,
110 however 
slightly different, while in 2008 it distinguished five different types of regulatory agencies.
111 
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Another confusing illustration of such incoherent communication was given in 2005, when the 
Commission published, with only months of interval between them, contradictory reform 
proposals on the regulatory agency system. What is the logic of proposing a five-year mandate 
for a director in newly created agencies, while proposing to change the mandate of the director 
of the EUMC to four years?
112 And what about parity between the Commission and Council 
representatives in administrative boards, and the idea that there should be no representative of 
the European Parliament on the board, two principles advocated in one document and neglected 
in another.
113 
Finally, there is even inconsistency regarding the status of an agency. For instance: according to 
the EU Europa official website,
114 the Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of 
Fusion Energy is a European regulatory agency in the framework of the first pillar of the EU. 
However, according to the last 2008 Commission communication, Joint Undertakings are not 
considered as agencies.
115 
These various illustrations show that the time has come to bring some order and clarity to the 
current situation of European agencies.  
3.4 Decentralisation 
Agencies are decentralised organisations enjoying considerable operational independence. 
They fulfil tasks that have been delegated to them from the centralised responsibility of the 
Commission. The decentralisation of the agencies can also be considered in a geographical 
sense, since a majority of agencies is scattered throughout the EU instead of being centred in 
Brussels or Luxembourg. This should add to the visibility of the EU and mitigate criticism 
against Brussels-based bureaucracy.  
However, linked to this decentralisation process is the issue regarding the location of agencies’ 
seat. The dispersion of European agencies throughout the EU is a symbolic gesture to bring the 
Community and its activities closer to the citizens. However, this idea of Community interest is 
not reflected in the way member states approach the issue of allocating an agency seat. For 
every member state, it has become of the utmost importance to have its ‘own’ agency. 
Contrary to the institutions and certain other bodies, the treaties do not provide any procedure or 
rule on how to allocate agency seats.
116 Since the 90s, unanimity is required to decide on the 
seat of agencies, as has always been the case for the seat of institutions.
117 The decision is taken 
at the highest level, at the European Council in order to reach a package deal compromise. In 
practice, the member states’ inability to agree has caused several agencies to start up only 
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provisionally. For instance, EMSA has been operational since 2003, but was only installed in 
Lisbon in 2006.  
Finally, questions can be asked about the rationality and administrative efficiency of locating 
European agencies in cities such as Heraklion, Parma or Angers. In the case of ERA, there are 
even two head offices due to internal national discord: the administrative seat is in Valenciennes 
and the conference centre is in Lille. Some practical disadvantages attached to such locations, 
such as difficult transport connections, unavailability of European schools, insufficient childcare 
and a lack of job opportunities for spouses create a barrier to the recruitment of the required 
experts.
118 
3.5  Subsidiarity & proportionality 
An issue linked to the decentralisation of EU governance to autonomous agencies is the 
question of subsidiarity. The principle of subsidiarity is contained in Article 5 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Communities, which states that:  
The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this 
Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein. In areas which do not fall within its 
exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the 
principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action 
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of 
the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.
119 
The question regarding whether all European agencies address issues that cannot be addressed 
satisfactorily at member state level but are rather achievable at Community level, remains to be 
seen. There are certainly no questions about this when it comes to agencies created to improve 
the functioning of the internal market, but what about EMCDDA, FRA and EIGE? Do the 
problems addressed by these agencies really have EU-wide scope?  
Related to subsidiarity is the principle of proportionality, as the Treaty states that “[a]ny 
action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this 
Treaty”.
120 Even if there is justification to act on Community level, limits remain to the extent 
and form of this action. Is the creation of a specific European agency the best way to deal with 
an issue such as gender equality?  
4.  Last Reform proposals 
4.1  The European Commission’s proposal 
As a response to the existing heterogeneity between European agencies and the questions 
related to accountability and control of agencies, the Commission took the initiative in 2005 to 
propose a general framework for regulatory agencies,
121 similar to the framework 
established for European executive agencies contained in Regulation (EC) 58/2003. The 
proposed single legal framework for regulatory agencies would have to contribute to four 
                                                      
118 F. Jones, op. cit., p. 9. 
119 See article 5 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (OJ 
2006 C321 E/46). 
120 See article 5 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (OJ 
2006 C321 E/46). 
121 Draft Interinstitutional Agreement, op. cit., 24 p. (COM (2005) 59 final). GOVERNANCE OF THE EU: THE REFORM DEBATE ON EUROPEAN AGENCIES REIGNITED | 23 
 
objectives: enhanced coherence, effectiveness, accountability and participation and openness of 
European regulatory agencies.  
However, institutional deadlock on the issue has prevented any progress so far. In 2008 the 
Commission announced that it would withdraw its 2005 proposal and try to reignite the debate, 
although the 2005 proposal remains a blueprint for the reopened discussions.
122 Despite the 
withdrawal of the proposal for a single legal framework for European regulatory agencies, 
the lines of thought in the proposal remain interesting and give insight into the way in which the 
Commission is willing to move on the issue. 
4.1.1  The proposal for an Inter-Institutional Agreement
123 
In the communication a regulatory agency is defined as: 
an independent legal entity created by the legislator in order to help regulate a 
particular sector at European level and help implement a particular Community policy. 
By performing its tasks, it helps to improve the way in which the rules are 
implemented and applied throughout the EU. It thus plays an active role in exercising 
executive powers at Community level. 
Tasks of regulatory agencies 
Regarding the tasks of regulatory agencies, the Commission went into further detail and listed 
3 types, of which regulatory agencies should perform one or more: (1) adopting individual 
decisions which are legally binding on third parties; (2) providing direct assistance to the 
Commission and, where necessary, to the member states in the interests of the Community, in 
the form of technical or scientific advice and/or inspection reports; (3) creating a network of 
national competent authorities and organising cooperation between them in the interests of the 
Community with a view to gathering, exchanging and comparing information and good 
practices. Each regulatory agency has the duty to gather, analyse and forward its objectives, in 
reliable and easy-to-understand information concerning its field of activity. Apart from these 
‘regulatory’ tasks, agencies also have executive responsibilities, because they take an active part 
in the execution of the EU’s executive powers.  
Agency creation 
Regarding the creation of an agency, the Commission puts forward three provisions. First, any 
proposal to create a new agency would be subjected to an impact assessment by the 
Commission. This would constitute a comprehensive evaluation in order to verify the necessity 
of a new agency being created. Second, an agency would preferably be based on a specific 
provision of the EC Treaty, rather than using Article 308 of the EC Treaty as the standard legal 
basis. However, in exceptional cases, it would remain possible to use Article 308 EC. Third, the 
decision regarding the seat of the agency should be integrated into the basic act, or if this is not 
possible, a decision should be taken within six months.  
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Internal organisation and structure 
The Commission recognised that there could be no one-size-fits-all model for administrative 
boards. This is an evolution in the Commission’s point of view, because in 2002 it did contend 
that there should be a single model of administrative boards consisting of 15 members in 
total.
124 However, it did indicate three general principles that should be applied to all 
administrative boards: (1) the composition should reflect the agency’s position with regard to 
the distribution of powers between the executives at Community and national levels; (2) there 
should only be a limited number of members and (3) interested parties should be involved in the 
work.  
The proposal introduced a different organisation of the representation in administrative 
boards, which would in practice considerably reduce member states’ influence in agencies, 
while reciprocally enhancing the Commission’s role. For starters, the Commission pleaded for 
the creation of parity between the Commission and the Council in the composition of 
administrative boards. Besides, it also proposed limited representation, arguing that not all 
member states should always be represented on the administrative boards. However, in the cases 
where it would be justified for every member state to have its own representative, then an equal 
number of votes should be granted to the members designated by the Council and to those 
designated by the Commission. Whereas for the European Parliament, it should no longer have 
any representatives on the administrative boards, in order to guarantee its capacity to perform 
solid external controls.  
In cases where the size of the administrative board prevents effective management, an executive 
board could be created. Here again, the Commission envisaged the equal representation of both 
2 branches of the Community Executive.  
A single procedure for the appointment and dismissal of the director is proposed. The 
administrative board would appoint the director on the basis of a list of candidates proposed by 
the Commission. Before being appointed, the candidate may be asked to make a statement 
before the European Parliament. The general term of office for a director would be five years, 
extendable once based on the proposal of the Commission and after an evaluation. The 
administrative board would have the possibility to dismiss the director before the end of that 
term, again on the proposal of the Commission. Previously, the Commission still wanted to 
retain the right to appoint the director of agencies with decision-making power legally binding 
to third persons, for which it would base itself on a list of candidates proposed by the 
administrative board.
125  
Some general provisions regarding the tasks and composition of scientific committees and 
boards of appeal were also incorporated. A distinction was also made between the internal and 
external linguistic regime. 
Accountability 
Because of the autonomous nature of agencies, the Commission was of the opinion that both ex 
ante and ex post evaluations and control mechanisms should be put in place. Any proposal to 
create a new agency would be subjected to a preliminary impact assessment by the Commission. 
Once the agency is set up and running, the Commission and the agency itself should have to 
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carry out regular evaluations. If the results of an evaluation indicate any problems or 
shortcomings, it would be up to the Commission to propose changes to the constituent act. 
A wide range of control mechanisms are envisaged by the Commission in order to ensure the 
proper functioning of the agency. Budgetary control should be guaranteed by internal audits, 
annual reports by the Court of Auditors, the annual discharge for the execution of the 
Community budget and the investigations conducted by OLAF. Political control will be 
exercised both by the Commission and the legislative authority. In particular, the European 
Parliament and the Council would have the right to ask the director to inform them about the 
agency’s activities. Judicial control would be the task of the Court of Justice once all internal 
appeal procedures have been exhausted. 
4.1.2  Reigniting the debate 
The failure to reach an inter-institutional agreement led the Commission to reopen the debate at 
the beginning of 2008. The reasons for this failure are multiple. There was the dispute between 
the legal services of the Council and of the Commission on whether an inter-institutional 
agreement was an appropriate instrument. This blocked the debate immediately. Moreover, the 
draft was not only too detailed, leaving the impression that there was no margin for discussion, 
but equally too ambitious as it touched on several politically sensitive issues.
126  
In the 2008 document, the Commission withdrew its 2005 draft for a common framework for 
European regulatory agencies. It invited the institutions to restart the discussion on the topic and 
announced a moratorium on the creation of new agencies. It proposed a horizontal evaluation of 
all agencies by 2010 and a review of the Commission’s internal systems governing the relations 
with agencies.
127 
By restricting itself to not making new proposals for the creation of agencies, the Commission 
made a gesture towards the other institutions. This signalled its willingness to come to an 
agreement. However, despite the withdrawal of the draft inter-institutional agreement, this 
proposal remains the blueprint of the discussion for the Commission.
128 The document states 
that “in the meantime, the Commission will continue to use the philosophy and core principles 
of the proposed inter-institutional agreement as a point of reference for its own approach to 
agencies”.
129 This implies that the Commission does not intend to divert much from the initial 
2005 proposal.  
The fact that the Commission is not putting a new proposal on the table contains both an 
opportunity and a risk. The other institutions could feel more involved as they can introduce 
their preferences more easily. However, for agencies themselves it would be easier to respond to 
a specific proposal.  
4.2  The European Parliament’s proposal 
The European Parliament adopted a resolution indicating some general principles regarding the 
creation and control of European agencies. The resolution called, inter alia, for the generalised 
use of the co-decision procedure to create new agencies. Furthermore, the resolution called for 
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parliamentary hearings of the candidates for the function of director and for the inclusion of an 
impact assessment and a cost-benefit assessment in the proposal for a new agency.
130  
The Budgetary Control Committee of the European Parliament issued a comparative analysis of 
the governance of agencies in several different member states and in the EU in 2008.
131 The aim 
was to distinguish best practices regarding the management of agencies and formulate 
recommendations for the governance of European agencies. The most important were: 
-  the number of agency types should be limited, with clearly defined rules on internal and 
external governance and accountability; 
-  small management board with a more diversified membership and an advisory role, except 
for decisions on the agency's budget, the annual work programme and the annual report; 
-  the driving institution behind the agency creation should provide clear explanations 
regarding the agency type, objectives, internal governance, budget responsibility, etc.; 
-  newly established agencies should be located in a member state which does not already 
have an agency;  
-  each EU agency should be subject to oversight by only one principal; 
-  yearly performance agreements should improve assessments;  
-  performances should be regularly scrutinised by the European Parliament and the Court of 
Auditors; 
-  each EU agency should have a well-defined appeal process.  
4.3  Assessment of the reform proposals 
The draft inter-institutional agreement was designed to improve the coherence, effectiveness 
and accountability of European regulatory agencies. Effectively, it did contain proposals that 
would improve the situation, such as a more uniform approach to the creation, the structure and 
the control provisions of European agencies. The proposal supports the basic idea that every 
new agency should have clearly defined powers, functions and operating procedures, which will 
allow for the enhanced transparency of an agency’s functioning and make control easier.  
One positive feature of the draft inter-institutional agreement that is worth mentioning is the 
intention to set up new agencies on the basis of a specific Treaty provision, rather than the 
general Article 308 EC. This does not only ensure a more flexible procedure in the Council, 
because majority voting replaces unanimity, but also implies a co-decision of the European 
Parliament in most policy areas, which would constitute an additional ‘necessity check’ and 
would increase the legitimacy of new agencies. Furthermore, the field of application of an 
agency set up on the basis of a specific Treaty provision is also more restricted than when it is 
left to the Council to formulate the agency’s scope of activities, as is the case in the procedure 
following the use of Article 308 EC.   
For reasons of effectiveness, the Commission’s proposal to keep administrative boards 
limited in size makes sense. With 27 member states, the rule that every member state should 
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have its own representative is no longer workable. A certain rotating system should be designed 
to address this issue. However, the Commission’s intention to introduce parity in the 
composition of administrative boards seems to contradict its desire to keep the number of board 
members limited.  
The fact that the Commission proposed an appointment procedure of an agency director who 
reflects the interests of all institutions, is to be welcomed. According to the draft, the 
administrative board should decide on the basis of a shortlist of candidates presented by the 
Commission after having taken parliamentary advice. However, in the case of a negative 
parliamentary opinion, a procedure could be envisaged requiring a special majority in the 
administrative board to counter this negative parliamentary advice. This would add weight to 
the parliament’s opinion, without creating an additional institutional barrier. 
Nevertheless, there were some aspects that raised concerns. 
The scope of the proposal was limited in two ways. First, it would only apply to those agencies 
created in the framework of the European Communities, leaving aside agencies active in the 
field of Common Foreign and Security Policy and in Police and Judicial Cooperation in 
Criminal Matters. Second, the existing agencies were not incorporated in the proposal, as it 
would only apply to new agencies.  
With regard to the creation of agencies, the proposal did provide for a preliminary impact 
assessment, but no objective or clearly defined criteria to establish the necessity of a new 
agency were introduced. Although the impact assessment would have to clarify aspects such as 
the added value for the Community, the agency’s objectives, potential alternatives, etc., the final 
decision would not be bound to certain basic criteria. In order to guarantee that any new 
European agency is responding to a genuine necessity and contributes to the improvement of 
political governance at European level, the proposal should be accompanied by a thorough 
motivation. This should not substitute impact or cost-benefit assessments, but complement 
them. 
Another regrettable issue is the Commission’s reluctance to accept representatives in 
administrative boards that have been appointed by the European Parliament.  In the 
Commission’s view, having a representative in the agency’s decision-making body would 
conflict with the Parliament’s role as the agency’s budgetary control entity. Nevertheless, this 
should not necessarily be the case, since the person appointed by the European Parliament 
would not be formally representing it in the administrative board. He or she would rather be an 
intermediary reporting back to Parliament on the agency’s activities. An additional missing 
point, which is linked to administrative boards, regards their functioning. The proposal 
neglected to set well-established procedures for the administrative board, in particular 
concerning the voting. 
The Commission proposals contain a wide range of control mechanisms for European agencies, 
many of which are already in effect in the newest agencies. The proposal fails to address the 
current inflation of the oversight mechanisms and procedures for European agencies. It is 
indeed difficult to obtain a balance between both thorough and comprehensive control of 
European agencies on the one hand and the need for operational independence on the other. 
Although the basic premises of the various proposed control mechanisms are justified, in 
practice this proposal could even add to the overlap between controls, which cause an 
evaluation fatigue and put a serious administrative burden on agencies. This is particularly the 
case for small agencies, with questionnaires and control visits conducted by various entities, 
which are often very similar in substance and create an administrative overload.  
Finally, besides elaborating on how to set up new European agencies in a more coherent way, 
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sign of good governance to close down the agencies that have fulfilled their role. For 
instance, one can wonder for how much longer the mandate of EAR should be extended since it 
is active in reconstruction efforts in the former Yugoslav republics since 1999. And if an 
agreement would be reached to set up a European Electronic Communications Market 
Authority, shouldn’t it be useful to merge it with ENISA, because both function in the field of 
communication technology? 
Conclusions  
European agencies have proven to be useful, if not indispensable instruments in European 
governance. The technical or scientific expertise incorporated and used by European agencies to 
assist the Commission and member states in the increasingly complicated European regulatory 
system is the principal argument in favour of such independent decentralised bodies.  
Furthermore, European agencies bring some flexibility to EU governance. On the one hand they 
possess a certain operational flexibility, while on the other the creation of new agencies 
provides the Commission with a more flexible response capability compared to working out 
new legislation.  
However, the system of European agencies contains a number of problematic aspects that have 
been addressed in this study. These issues concern the legitimacy and accountability (political, 
judicial, financial, administrative and public accountability) of the agency’s actions, the large 
diversity between the different agencies in how they relate to decentralisation, subsidiarity and 
proportionality. Finally, there is the current typology, which is unclear, confusing and internally 
contradictory. 
What can now be expected of the debate that has been reopened on European agencies? Despite 
the breakthrough of the institutional deadlock and the attempt to reignite the debate on European 
agencies, the outcome and timetable are still very unclear. The Commission has stated its 
willingness to retain as many elements as possible from its 2005 proposal. Although too far-
reaching and ambitious at the time, it did contain a range of elements that addressed the issues 
at stake regarding agencies. What remains an open question is whether it will not prove to be 
equally difficult to come to an agreement within the newly launched institutional debate on the 
same politically sensitive issues as before. The fact that the Commission is not even coming 
forward with an adapted draft proposal could hamper progress further.  
Irrespective of the outcome of the institutional debate and the Commission’s self-imposed 
moratorium on any new agency proposals until after the completion of evaluations in 2010, 
there seems to be a tendency towards continued ‘agencification’ in the EU. Although the 
advantages of decentralised, autonomous agencies in European governance are clear, this should 
not distract us from the issues of accountability, legitimacy, decentralisation, subsidiarity and 
proportionality linked to the agencification process and the heterogeneity of the current system 
of European agencies. In order not to lose the benefits of European agencies, continued efforts 
should be made to address these issues in a proactive manner for new agencies and in a reactive 
way in order to remedy the current situation.  
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Annex: European regulatory agencies 
Agency  Date of Creation & Legal Source  Description of activities 
CEDEFOP: European Centre for the 
Development of Vocational Training - 
Thessaloniki 
10 February 1975 - Regulation (EEC) 
337/1975 
To promote a European area of lifelong learning throughout an 
enlarged EU, by providing information on and analyses of vocational 
education and training systems, policies, research and practice. 
EUROFOUND: European Foundation 
for the Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions - Dublin 
26 May 1975 - Regulation (EEC) 
1365/1975 
To provide information, advice and expertise – on living and working 
conditions, industrial relations and managing change in Europe – for 
key actors in the field of EU social policy on the basis of comparative 
information, research and analysis. 
ETF: European Training Foundation – 
Torino 
7 May 1990 - Regulation (EEC) 
1360/1990 
To contribute to the development to the vocational training systems in 
partner countries and to facilitate dialogue amongst stakeholders by 
developing international, national and local networks. 
EEA: European Environment Agency – 
Copenhagen 
7 May 1990 - Regulation (EEC) 
1210/1990 
To provide sound and independent information on the environment 
and environmental policies and to develop and coordinate the 
European environment information and observation network (Eionet).  
EMCDDA: European Monitoring Centre 
for Drugs and Drug Addiction – Lisbon 
8 February 1993 - Regulation (EEC) 
302/1993 
To gather, analyse and disseminate objective, reliable and comparable 
information on drugs and drug addiction and, in so doing, provide its 
audiences with a sound and evidence-based picture of the drug 
phenomenon at European level. 
EMEA: European Medicines Agency – 
London 
22 July 1993 - Regulation (EEC) 
2309/1993 
To perform the scientific evaluation of applications for European 
marketing authorisation for medicinal products for human and 
veterinary use. 
OHIM: Office for Harmonisation in the 
Internal Market (Trade Marks and 
Designs) – Alicante 
20 December 1993 - Regulation (EC) 
40/1994 
To register and manage the applications for the Community trade 
mark and the Community registered design.  
EU-OSHA: European Agency for Safety 
and Health at Work – Bilbao 
18 July 1994 - Regulation (EC) 
2062/1994 
To develop, analyse and disseminate information to improve 
occupational safety and health in Europe and to develop a 
comprehensive network with national focal points, European 
institutions, European social partners, and international organisations. 30 | ANDOURA & TIMMERMAN 
 
CPVO: Community Plant Variety Office 
– Angers 
27 July 1994 - Regulation (EC) 
2100/1994 
To implement and apply a system for the protection of plant variety 
rights. 
CdT: Translation Centre for the Bodies 
of the European Union – Luxembourg 
28 November 1994 - Regulation (EC) 
2965/1994 
To provide the translation services required by the institutions, bodies 
and decentralised agencies of the European Union. 
EUROPOL: European Police Office – 
The Hague 
18 April 2008 - Regulation not yet 
published in the Official Journal of the 
EU. 
(original: 26 July 1995 – Convention)  
To help member states co-operate more closely and effectively in 
preventing and combating organised international crime by facilitating 
the exchange of information between Europol and Europol Liaison 
Officers, providing operational analysis and supporting member 
states’ operations, providing expertise and technical support for 
investigations and operations carried out within the EU and generating 
strategic reports and crime analysis on the basis of information and 
intelligence supplied by member states or gathered from other 
sources. 
FRA: European Union Fundamental 
Rights Agency – Vienna  
(Before: EUMC: European Monitoring 
Centre on Racism and Xenophobia) 
15 February 2007 - Regulation (EC) 
168/2007  
(2 June 1997 - Regulation (EC) 
1035/1997) 
To provide Community institutions and member states with 
information, assistance and expertise on fundamental rights when 
implementing community law, and to support them in taking measures 
and formulating appropriate courses of action. 
EAR: European Agency for 
Reconstruction – Thessaloniki 
15 November 1999 - Regulation (EC) 
2454/1999 
To manage the main EU assistance programmes in Serbia and 
Montenegro (Republic of Serbia, Republic of Montenegro, UN-
administered Kosovo) and FYR of Macedonia. 
ISS: European Union Institute for 
Security Studies – Paris 
20 July 2001 - Council Joint Action 
2001/554/CFSP 
To help create a common European security culture, to support the 
strategic debate by organising research and debate on security and 
defence issues that are of importance to the EU and to create a 
network of academics, officials, experts and decision-makers in order 
to provide a forward-looking analysis on security and defence issues. 
EUSC: European Union Satellite Centre - 
Torrejon de Ardoz 
20 July 2001 - Council Joint Action 
2001/555/CFSP 
To support the decision-making of the European Union by providing 
analysis of satellite imagery and collateral data. 
EFSA: European Food Safety Authority 
– Parma 
28 January 2002 - Regulation (EC) 
178/2002 
To collect and analyse scientific data, identify emerging risks and 
provide independent scientific advice on all matters with a direct or 
indirect impact on food safety, including animal health and welfare 
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EUROJUST: The European Union’s 
Judicial Cooperation Unit - The Hague 
28 February 2002 - Council Decision 
2002/187/JHA 
To enhance the effectiveness of the competent authorities within 
member states when they are dealing with serious cross-border and 
organised crime, to stimulate and improve the coordination of 
investigations and prosecutions and to support the member states in 
order to render their investigations and prosecutions more effective. 
EMSA: European Maritime Safety 
Agency – Lisbon 
27 June 2002 - Regulation (EC) 
1406/2002 
To assist the Commission and the national authorities in matters of 
maritime safety, security and the prevention of pollution caused by 
ships, to control the proper application of EU law in this field and to 
promote cooperation between national authorities. 
EASA: European Aviation Safety 
Agency – Köln 
15 July 2002 - Regulation (EC) 
1592/2002 
To provide technical expertise to the European Commission by 
assisting in the drafting of rules for aviation safety and to carry out the 
certification of aeronautical products and organisations involved in 
their design, production and maintenance, which help to ensure 
compliance with airworthiness and environmental protection 
standards. 
ENISA: European Network and 
Information Security Agency – Heraklion 
10 March 2004 - Regulation (EC) 
460/2004 
To advise and assist the Commission and the member states on 
information security and to address security-related problems in 
hardware and software products in dialogue with industry, to collect 
and analyse data on security incidents in Europe and emerging risks, 
to promote risk assessment and risk management methods to enhance 
our capability to deal with information security threats, to exchange 
best practices and to track the development of standards for products 
and services on network and information society. 
ECDC: European Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control – Stockholm 
21 April 2004 - Regulation (EC) 
851/2004 
To enhance the capacity of the Community and the member states to 
protect human health through the prevention and control of human 
disease, to act on its own initiative when outbreaks of contagious 
illnesses of unknown origin threaten the Community and to ensure 
complementary and coherent action in the field of public health by 
bringing together the member states, the EU Institutions and the 
relevant international organisations. 
ERA: European Railway Agency – 
Lille/Valenciennes 
29 April 2004 - Regulation (EC) 
881/2004 
To reinforce safety and interoperability of railways throughout 
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GSA: The European Global Navigation 
Satellite Systems Supervisory Authority – 
Undecided (provisionally in Brussels) 
12 July 2004 - Regulation (EC) 
1321/2004 
To manage the European satellite navigation programmes.  
EDA: European Defence Agency – 
Brussels 
12 July 2004 - Council Joint Action 
2004/551/CFSP 
To improve the EU’s defence capabilities, especially in the field of 
crisis management, to promote EU armaments cooperation, to assist in 
the development and overall restructuring of the European defence 
industry and to promote EU defence-related Research and 
Technology. 
FRONTEX: European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation 
at the External Borders – Warsaw 
26 October 2004 - Regulation (EC) 
2007/2004 
To coordinate operational cooperation between member states in the 
field of management of external borders, to assist member states in the 
training of national border guards, to strengthen border security by 
ensuring the coordination of Member States’ actions in the 
implementation of Community measures relating to the management 
of the external borders and to promote overall coherency by liaising 
with other Community and EU partners responsible for the security of 
the external borders. 
CFCA: Community Fisheries Control 
Agency – Vigo 
26 April 2005 - Regulation (EC) 
768/2005 
To organise operational coordination of fisheries control and 
inspection activities by the member states and to assist them to 
cooperate so as to comply with the rules of the Common EU Fisheries 
Policy in order to ensure its effective and uniform application. 
CEPOL: European Police College – 
Bramshill 
20 September 2005 - Council 
Decision 2005/681/JHA 
To encourage cross-border cooperation in the fight against 
crime, maintenance of public security and law and order by organising 
courses, seminars and conferences with senior police officers from 
across Europe.  
ECHA: European Chemicals Agency – 
Helsinki 
18 December 2006 - Regulation (EC) 
1907/2006 
To manage the registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction 
processes for chemical substances, to ensure consistency in chemicals 
management across the EU and to provide technical and scientific 
advice, guidance and information on chemicals. 
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Under preparation: 
EIGE: European Institute for Gender 
Equality – Vilnius 
20 December 2006 - Regulation (EC) 
1922/2006 
To contribute to and strengthen the promotion of gender equality 
and the fight against discrimination based on sex, to collect, analyse 
and disseminate relevant, objective, comparable and reliable 
information as regards gender equality, to raise EU citizens' 
awareness of gender equality and to set up and coordinate a 
European Network on Gender Equality. 
 
Proposed Regulatory Agencies: 
-  Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators 
-  European Electronic Communications Market Authority 
 
European executive agencies 
PHEA: Executive Agency for the Public 
Health Programme – Brussels 
15 December 2004 - Decision 
2004/858/EC 
To support actions to improve and protect human health in the EU. 
EACEA: Education, Audiovisual and 
Culture Executive Agency – Brussels 
14 January 2005 - Decision 
2005/56/EC 
To implement the Community funded programmes and actions in 
the fields of education and training, active citizenship, youth, 
audiovisual and culture. 
TEN-TEA: Trans-European Transport 
Network Executive Agency – Brussels 
26 October 2006 - Decision 
2007/60/EC 
To manage the projects and events for the promotion of the Trans-
European Transport Network. 
EACI: Executive Agency for 
Competitiveness and Innovation – Brussels 
(Before: IEEA: Intelligent Energy 
Executive Agency) 
31 May 2007 - Decision 2007/372/EC  To manage the projects and events funded under Intelligent Energy 
- Energy Europe programme and to disseminate the resulting know-
how and best practices. 
ERC: European Research Council 
Executive Agency - Brussels (Under 
preparation) 
14 December 2007 - Decision 
2008/37/EC 
To stimulate scientific excellence in Europe by supporting and 
encouraging the very best, truly creative scientists, scholars and 
engineers. 
REA: Research Executive Agency – 
Brussels 
14 December 2007 - Decision 
2008/46/EC 
To evaluate the proposals and manage the research projects of the 
current research framework programme FP7. 
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